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A 
For the reasons given in the attached explanatory statement, the Economic Affairs Committee 
submits the following motion for a resolution to the vote of the European Parliament: 
Motion for a resolution 
on the problems of the steel industry in the Community 
The European Parliament, 
having regard to the report of its Economic Affairs Committee (Doc. 12/68), 
1. Notes that the difficulties still prevailing in the Community steel industry 
are not such as might be described as constituting a serious crisis; 
2. Notes that the recent increase in steel production and in sales on the world 
and Community markets does not encourage the belief that the growth of the 
Community steel industry is liable to be jeopardized by structural factors affecting 
consumption; 
3. Considers that current difficulties are not so much due to the creation of 
surplus capacities in recent years as to the utter confusion regarding prices and to 
the lack of concerted action at Community level in directing investments towards 
the creation of larger production units; 
4. Considers that a general, voluntary control of output-the 'centre-board' of 
a Community steel policy-would be desirable, in contrast to individualized control, 
based on quarterly forecasts for each concern, which Parliament believes would not 
be effective; 
5. Speaks for the interests of consumers in warning that any relaxation of price 
control would eventually have an adverse effect and considers that controls need 
to be made more effective by recourse to spot checks; 
6. Points out that a Community steel policy based on long-term forecasts has 
become more necessary than ever in view of the fact that public authorities in 
some member States have intervened to finance new plant construction and plant 
redevelopment; 
7. Believes that it is clearly for the Executive to achieve the following objectives 
by means of a Community steel policy: 
(a) ensuring continuity of employment in regions affected by redevelopment and 
rationalization measures and promoting the harmonization of primary and 
secondary working conditions; 
(b) avoiding any competition between the member States in granting inadmis:>ible 
subsidies from the national treasuries; 
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(c) ~avoiding the creation of structural surplus capacity; 
(d) seeing to it that the rationalization and development of concerns in terms of 
increasing their size is effected smoothly and, for this purpose, seeing to it that 
recourse is had to the possibilities held out by recent technological progress; 
8. Considers that the implementation of this active steel policy necessarily 
implies Community finance and stresses the importance of the question of the 
Community's own resources; 
9. Asks its President to transmit this resolution and the report of its responsible 
Committee to the Council and to the Commission of the European Communities. 
B 
EXPLANATORY STATEMENT 
!-Introduction 
1. After studying Mr. Kriedemann's report on 
the High Authority memorandum laying down 
the General Objectiws for Steel of the Community 
for 1970,(1 ) Parliament passed a resolution in 
which it called upon its Economic Affairs 
Committee to assess the results of Parliament's 
discussion of the report, to continue talks with the 
High Authority· on points still outstanding and to 
submit proposals for practical decisions as soon 
as possible. Before the vote was taken on this 
resolution, Parliament debated the problems of 
the Community steel industry at its plenary 
session of 31 January l\H\7; it did so on the basis 
of the reports by Mr. Kriedemann and by Mr. 
Blaisse; the latter was drawn up for the Internal 
Market \ommittee. A few months later, at its 
June session, Parliament again discussed steel 
problems. This time it did so on the basis of Miss 
Lulling's report on the High Authority's 15th 
General Report. (2) 
This report is based on tht: documents referred 
to. l\Ir. Blaisse's surwy of the state of the steel 
market. as presented i~ his report, remains valid 
in many ways in the present situation. We shall 
not refer again in this report to the numerous 
comments and questions raised in Mr. Kriedemann's 
report in those instances where the High Authority 
has dealt with them. 
2. In its resolution of 31 ] anuary 1967, 
Parliament called upon the High Authority and 
the Council to submit a programme for bringing 
the steel industry into line \Vith economic and 
technical developments as soon as possible and to 
frame Commumty measures to deal with the 
current danger of a crisis. (3) 
Your Committee will not refer again to the 
danger of a crisis, although it still feels that a 
Community steel policy needs to be implemented. 
(1) O{jtctal Gazette No. 28 of 17 February 1967, pages 440/67 
(2) A certam number of significant passagf's from thE' re5:olutwns passf~d by 
Parliament after examming these reports are given In Annf'x I 
(') O{jtcwl Gazette No. 28 of 17 Feuruary 1967, page 441/67. 
It will endeavour, in this report, to illustrate 
the pertinence of suggestions made during \'arious 
parliamentary debates on the steel question, with 
a view to solving some of the problems arising. It 
will also outline its views on the steel policy to be 
pursued at the Community level. It hopes ihat the 
European Commission will not be long now in 
submitting definite proposals. If the Community 
institutions wish to keep any kind of control ov~r 
developments in the Communitv steel industry 
they must act without delay., This is urge~t 
because various member States ha\'e alread\· 
taken, or enyisage taking. actwn at the nation~] 
level. 
11-Recent developments in the steel industry 
Prices 
3. During the second half of 1967, steel prices 
in the Community have become somewhat more 
stable. They have, of course, settled at a fairlv low 
level but it should not be forgotten that th~ low 
price of steel has had a favourable effect on the 
competiti~e position of the steel-using industries 
in the Community. Community rates are 15 to 40 
per cent lower than those quoted by the other 
major steel-producing countries.(l). The prices 
quoted in the Community are the result of an 
alignment with the relati,;ely low price schedules 
of some Community producers or with quotations 
from third countries, i.e. where what is involved is 
not just a straightforward infringement of Article 
60 of the Treaty. The resulting situation leaves 
much to be desired in terms of transparency and 
non-discrimination, although there has been some 
improyement here, too. Recent improvements in 
output may, indeed, have been due to the setting 
up of four large steel-selling agencies in Germany. 
The high export figures are, in this respect, partic-
ularly remarkable. 
e) Rf,purt on tht Ftfiunth Gtneral Rtport of the ECSC Htgh A uthonty mz 
the acft11tt1es of the Communzty, paragraph 72. 
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Prod11ction capacity utili:::atio11 
4. In 1967 the average rate of capacity 
utilization in Community steel industries was 
80 per cent. although there \Wre \Yide yariations 
from one country to another: 76 per cent in the 
Federal Republic of Germany. approximately !:Hi 
per cent -Yery close to the maximum-in the 
Netherlands, about FlO per cent in France, Italv 
and Luxembourg and 79 per cent in Belgium. . 
5. Ther~c• is nothing to proye that a slight surplus 
capacity will necessarily affect the fmancial 
position of iron and steel firms adversely. A.ccurcling 
to the Executin''s quarterly programme of 
September 1067, a rate of utilization of Sb per cent 
is regarded by some as normal. A basic inch1;;try, 
such as the iron and steel industry, must have 
sufficient capacity to deal iYith fluctuations in 
demand .. \ rate of utilization of 100 per cent, 
mon·oyer, is really no more than a tlworeticcd 
possibility. the re:d maximum being around \113 
per cent. Rapid technological change clearly leads 
to surplus capacity. . 
\Vhen comparing the surplus capacity of the 
Communitv and .\merican steel indu~tries the 
follo"·ing factors haye to be taken into account: 
surplus capacity is a term interpreted more broadly 
in the ECSC than in the USA and short-term 
increases or decreases in the labour force im·olye 
fewer difficulties there than here so that, if onlv 
for this reason, (which is, moreowr, yery sound) 
the tendenc~' to maintain a surplus capacity' is 
more pronounced in the Community than ll). the 
United States. . 
0 bstacl es to u·orld trade 
6. The Kennedy Round was important for the 
steel industry mainly because most of the world's 
steel producers now agree that import duties on 
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steel products should be harmonized. In fiye wars' 
time, the average rate of import duties ":ill be 
5. 7 per cent in the Community, 5 per cent in the 
USA and 7.5 per cent ir. Japan (these are average 
rate::.). Community products that are particularly 
sen~ItiYe to non-member country competition ar'e 
at present enjoying a high(·r lewl of protection, 
with duties ranging frum 4 to tl per cent. 
It is worth noting that the countries that han 
taken part in tbe Kennedv Round reached an 
agreement under \Yhich anti~dumping duties could 
only be introduced in future on certain conditions. 
i'. The results of the Kennedy Round hayc 
given a new impetus to trade in iron and steel 
products between the Community and third 
countries although it will take som~ time for the 
anticipated efft'cts to register. It has to be borne 
in mind that a cut in duties might very well be 
negated in certain cases by non-tariff practices or 
proyisiuns constituting obstacles to trade. It is to 
be hoped that the nationali,ced coal and steel 
industry of the United Kingdom will not feel 
bound to pursue a more nationalist policy for 
as long as Britain is not admitted into the 
Communities. Similarly, influential members of 
the US Congre:'-s ha;-e just put forward a series of 
protectionist proposals including import quotas 
for iron and steel proclucts.(1) Clearly these different 
non-tariff obstacles could jeopardize the results of 
the lengthy Kennedy Round negotiations. In a 
resolution of 29 Nowmber 1967, on the results of 
the Kennedy Round, the European Parliament 
again drew attention to this danger. (2) 
Employment trends 
8. The following table drawn up by the European 
Commission shmvs employment trends in the 
Community iron and steel industry: 
(1) FcJrtunatPly, the US GovernmPnt has spcc1ficallv disavowed thE'Sf' 
propo..,als follmvm;,:! 1vh1ch Congtt :3S dec1Jed to tdk~ no further actwn 
on th<-: ruattcr fnr one yt>ar 
(2 1 Doc 153,167, 
Personnel employed in the Community Iron and Steel Industry 
31 December 1960 
\Vorkers Total ('1 
Germany (Fed. Rep.) 
North Germany 20,354 23,492 
North Rhine-\Vestphalia 145,002 Hl5,234 
South Germany 18,780 21,741 
Saar 30,674 34,852 
Total 214,810 I 245,319 I 
Belgium 
Liege 23,519 26,953 
CharlerOI and Centre 24,445 28,014 
Other regions 6,478 7,451 
Total 54,442 I G2,418 I 
France 
North 24,()50 29,713 
Lorraine 78,065 93,256 
Centre 14,821 18,140 
vYest 7,332 8,850 
South West 3,ll4 3,760 
South East 3,708 4,477 
Total 131.690 1 158,1961 
Italy 
North 42,423 48,554 
Cen-tre and South 10,474 ll,987 
Total 52,897 I 60,541 I 
Luxembourg 19,353 21,477 
Netherlands 9,261 13,(]71 
Community 482,453 56l.G22 
e) \\'orkers, clencal, tcchmcal and executlvf' strtff. 
Over the last seven years the number of jobs 
in the iron and steel industry has fallen by only 
6 per cent, while the number of workers fell by 
10 per cent. This decrease which has, on the whole, 
been relatively slight, is, by and large, being taken 
up in the normal way, although regional difficulties 
cannot be ruled out. 
('000 person; employed) 
31 December 1963 31 December 1966 30 June 1967 
\\Yorkers Total (1} \\''orkers Total (1) \Vorkcrs Total (1 ) 
22,185 27,000 21,(]80 27,586 21,708 27,698 
135,869 158,123 124,421 153,588 120,837 148,851 
14,698 17,437 13,965 16,860 13,480 16,267 
27,5.54 31,936 26,515 31,390 25,507 30,389 
200,306 I 234,496 I 186,581 I 229,424 I 181,532 I 223,214 
22,447 27,:387 18,535 23,333 18,159 22,936 
22,918 2G, 17.5 20,826 23,889 20,781 23,831 
6,467 7,217 8,338 9,962 8,722 10,337 
51,8321 60,779 I 
47,699 
I 
57,184 I 47,(]62 I 57,104 
25,784 32,338 24,423 31,212 23,508 30,296 
76.742 93,7G7 69,8ll 8(),823 67,613 84,960 
13,665 17.239 ll,820 15,191 ll,G94 15,101 
6,793 8,116 6,132 7,436 6,033 7,325 
2,623 3,254 1,341 1,740 1,324 1,718 
3,806 4,735 3,542 4,430 3,493 4,375 
129,4131 159,4491 ll7,0691 146,8321 ll3,6651 143,775 
I 
43,787 51,051 38,501 45,471 38,700 45,599 
14,774 17,687 18,592 22,870 18,099 22,605 
58,561 I 68,738 
I 
57,093 I 68,341 I 5o,799 I 68,204 I 
19,0651 21,662 19,566 22,366 19,459 22,266 
10,1491 15,907 ll,941 18,407 ll,718 18,158 
469,32G 561,031 439,949 532,721 
Tlze merger of the Executi1•e~ 
9. One member of the new European 
Commission, Mr. Colonna di Paliano, was entrusted 
with the special responsibility of looking into 
industrial policy problems. Your Committee hopes 
that the reorganization of the Executive will make 
possible a coherent analysis ?~ steel problems a~d 
serve as a pattern for pronswns to be taken m 
other areas of structural policy. 
III-Activities and proposals of the Executives 
Voluntary 01ttput control 
10. The High Authority's choice of measures to 
alleviate pressure on steel prices showed a preference 
for some form of control, albeit Yoluntary, oyer 
production. This preference is easy to explain. ~he 
quat terly forecasts dra'm UJ? by· the Ex~cuhve 
pursuant to Article 46 do, mdeed, pronde an 
excellent starting point. If the European 
Commission acts on the same lines as the High 
Authority set for itself. it v;ill draw up more 
differentiated forecasts than has so far been the 
case. The High Authority intended to make 
forecasts not only for groups of products but also 
in terms of indi,:idual enterprises. The end result 
could thus be a sort of guide production programme 
for the steel industry.(1) 
11. One of the advantages of production control 
-as Mr. Hellwig, (who was then a member of the 
High Authority) pointed out in Pa:liament on 
31 January Hl67-is that a r:l~tlvely shl?ht 
fall-off in supply would be suff1c1ent to bnng 
about a considerable easing of the downward 
pressure on prices. The Executive's preference ~or 
direct action in regard to the lewl of productwn 
is partly due too to the lack of enthusiasm for the 
alternative, Yil. greater price control. 
12. The new forecasts do, howeyer, have serious 
drawbacks which haye not attracted sufficient 
attention, either in committee or in plenary session. 
The representative of the High Authority told 
Parliament of two criteria for drawing up forecasts 
for enterprises: the production of preYious years 
and the current capacity. (2) 
It is to be feared that if these criteria are 
applied, production may be adwrsely affected. 
Similarh·, the choice of a period of reference could 
im·olve 
0 
difficulties because those enterprises, 
which haye so far acted on the Executive's 
forecasts, would find themselves recompensed by 
forecasts of a relatiyely lmY lewl. 
Industrial circles, moreon·r, have technical 
objections to such prm·isional estimates. For 
technical reasons, it may be advantageous to 
spread a certain volume of production un~v:nly 
over a given period and it may be asked 1f 1t 1s 
(I) Communicatwn on the prov1S10nal programmt·~ for the steel industry 
(Artlclf' 46 of the freaty), O!}tclal Ga:;ctte Xo. ~19 of 29 November 1966; 
Sf'P also the state-ments bv Mr. HP!hng to the European Parliament; 
debatP of 31 January 1967,- page 63 and 1\Ir. Copp6's speech m the- Euro~ 
pean Parliament on 14 March 1967. 
(') Debate of 31 January 1967, page 61. 
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possible, in the forecasts, to make due allowance 
for this. 
Article 46,3, item 2, leaves no room for doubt that 
the programmes are drawn up for guidance 
purposes. It cannot be ruled out, however, that 
enterprises working under unfavourable conditions 
mav insist that the quarterly programmes become 
binding in character. Some have already asked for 
a restriction to be placed on Interpenetration by 
couplmg an intensification of inter-Community 
trade with an increase in steel consumption. It goes 
without saying that such a variable quota system 
would be the death knell of the Common Market. 
Even for a limited period it would be unacceptable 
because it would amount to freezing the market 
Ill its present state. 
Yet the major objection to the Executive's plan 
to draw up more differentiated quarterly pro-
grammes is that in fact, even taking into account 
the additional data it now has in hand, the 
European Commission does not have a sufficient 
knowledge of the outlets open to the various 
enterprises on the different markets which have to 
be tctken into account if Yalid and detailed forecasts 
are to be drawn up. Enterprises cannot be expected 
reallv to relv on forecasts broken down between 
firm~; your 0 Rapporteur was made aware that 
industrial circles consider that they are only of 
limited value. 
Your Committee took note of the statement in 
the last quarterly programme,(1 ) to the e~ect that 
a more detailed method of calculatmg and 
publishing forecasts by pr.oducts or group of 
products is still under cons1deratwn. It may be 
asked whether attention should not be focussed 
solelv on production but also on the probable trend 
in c;nsumption. 
13. This is whv your Committee considers that 
the European Co'rnmission should confine its 
forecasts to countries or relevant markets and to 
categories of products. These would he useful to 
steel firms in deciding their policy and would 
enable them to take their inwstment decisions 
with a better knowledge of the facts. 
To keep production within certain .limits 
recourse should be had to the implementatwn of 
a common policy for steel and the different national 
measures (joint selling agencies, industrial plans, 
etc.(2) should be brought into line with, and made 
subject to, this policy. 
It might be useful to set up a European 
consultative committee under the European 
Commission for this purpose. 
(1 ) O{lzClai Gaoette No. 319/67. 
(2 ) See paragraphs 22 ff 
Market transparency and price control 
(a) Causes of the drop in prices 
14. The reasons for the fall in prices are well 
known; they are the low prices on the world 
market and above all the keen competition on the 
common market. The wa\" steel firms in the six 
countries act on the market is the reason why this 
competition is so keen, each striYing to achitTe a 
high rate of output utilization. It frequently 
occurs in the Community for the selling depart-
ments to take the initiative \Yithout m<-lking 
sufficient allowance for the structure of production 
costs. There can be no doubt that it would be 
extremt>ly desirable to dowtail sales and production. 
Action on the market follo\vs the pattern of 
the market structure whose characteristic is that 
there are a great number of firms none of which is 
in a position to be a pace-maker in regard to 
prices. It is not true that low price quotations on 
the part of small Community firms or tltiul co1tntry 
enteprises oblige the large firms to fall into line 
with these prices. What happens in fact is rather 
that the large firms use the low price selling by the 
small ones of small quantities of steel as a pretext 
for introducing price reduction;, to large quantities 
of the products concerned. (1 ) 
To put steel price trends in any perspective, it 
should not be forgotten that ,;orne costs, such as 
transport charges and iron ore prices haye fallen 
in recent years. At the beginning of this year, 
moreoyer, there was a fm ther reduction in the 
price of Swedi~h iron ore. An increase in the wage 
bill, on the other hand, is probable. 
(b) Supm•ision of the implementation of "-lrticle 6U 
of tlze Treah• 
15. Supervising the implementation of Article 60 
is rendered difficult by one or two gaps in the 
Treaty. Community control owr prices, for 
example, does not go beyond the production stage, 
which means that its effects are necessarily limited. 
To widen this control and cover the mark-eting a,1d 
utilization stages would bring one face to face with 
legal difficulties. Indeed, this control would have 
to be carried out bv the national authorities, which 
do not, themselve~, haye the necessary powers. 
The control at present exercized has further 
shortcomings: it is not frequent enough, the 
(1) Obvwusly with such a n·latlvely homogeneous product as stePl, a firm's 
competitive position IS to a great extent dependent on the pnces 1t 
quote.s; but there are other s1gnlficant factors as (a) dirPct contact 
Wllh the user (wh1ch !S of value both commcrcldll)' and techmcally), (b) 
the quality of the products, (c) mt>eting delivery dates, (d) avallalnhty 
of stocks, (e) technical scrvjce, (f) a selective sale~ poJicy whiCh may, 
for Pxamplf', mean not sr'lhng to buyers who are merely lookmg for 
differences In price, and not attemptmg to corner a whoJe area of the 
marke-t. 
controllers do not make sure that the products 
supplied are actually of the same quality as that 
quoted in the books of account and, lastl\', the 
differences in the rate structure make this c-ontrol 
very complicated. Your Committee does not think 
that any real progress is possible with regard to 
the first two points unless the present control 
machiner_l' is strengthened. vY1th regard to the 
third point-,the structural differences in the price 
lists-it mav he asked what the Executive has so 
far done to. make these price lists of a standard 
type and, hence, to increase market tran~parency. 
16. In reply to a written question from your 
rapporteur(1 ) the European Commission recently 
stated that it made 43 price checb between Jul_l' 
1966 and June l\Hi7. From this, it emerges that 
the number of checks decreased appreciably 
during the first half of 1 ~Hi7. If this decrease means 
that the Executiw prefers to make fewer but more 
thorough checks, your Committee has no objection 
to make. Although it must be recognized that 
infringements of Article !iO are very frequent and 
that the ftnes and warnings to which the ExecutiYe 
may haYe recourse are not enough. of themsehTs, 
to ensure compliance with the proYisions of ArtJde 
60, price control must remain an important feature 
of the European Commission's steel policy. The 
ExecutiYe must haye the means, if ewntually this 
should prow necessary, to check any undue 
increase in prices in the interests of the consumer. 
Progress as regards concentration could culminate 
in a situation comparable to that which ohliged 
President Kenned~·, little mme than fiw years 
ago, to interyene in connexion with the setting of 
prices in the American steel industry. 
Readaptation 
17. The High Authority has, to its credit, a 
great man_l' achievements in the sphere of readap-
tation. It is of capital importance for the Executive 
to he endowed with the necessarv means to pursue 
and, if necessary, to intensify the action taken by 
the High Authority in such an important sector 
as this. There is no need for us to elaborate at 
this stage; this point was dealt with in detail in 
the 15th General Report of the High Authority.(2) 
The Executive is not obliged to refer to social 
considerations in refusing its approval for a 
concentration plan which is economically well-
advised. Yet in every case, it analyses the 
anticipated consequences in terms of employment 
and in terms of working conditions. On the whole, 
as Miss Lulling points out in the report referred to, 
the social partners gave their approval to the 
Executive's application of the social provisions 
of the Treaty of Paris. 
(1) Otf1Clal Gaoetle No. 256 of 23 October 1967, page 11. 
(2 ) Doc. 66/67. 
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Scient-ific and technical research 
18. Article 55 of the Treaty makes it legally 
possible for the ExecutiYe to interwne in the field 
of scientific and technical research. The financial 
independence of its executive bodies enables the 
ECSC to see to the implementation of these Treaty 
provisions itself. Your rapporteur has already 
emphasized in a session of the European Parliament 
that these opportunities han' not been taken full 
advantage of. The High Authority has spread the 
financial means at its disposal over too hnge a 
number of projects, so that it has not achiewd 
enough in terms of the transition from the research 
to the industrial stage. 
Now that the steel industry IS engaged in a 
rationali;;;ation and concentration phase, it is 
vitally important for this sector that research and 
especially work on technical development should 
receive solid backing. This is a major challenge 
for the Executive which should make a wry 
careful selection and concentrate its efforts on a 
limited number of projects. 
The results of research should be of benefit to 
small and medium-sized firms which wish to 
specialize. 
Structural policy 
19. The main criticism of the High Authoritv 
about its policy has been that it has not really 
achieved a position from which to influence the 
long-term devt'lopment of the steel industry. 
Although the Treat)' gives tlw Executive certain 
means of interwntion, it hardly enables it to take 
anv action in depth in regard to thE' structures of 
th~ steel industry and this is partly the causE'. 
Yet the Executive can also be criticized for its 
diffidence in making use of the Treaty provisions 
to vvhich it could have had recourse to launch a 
structural policy. 
The loans granted by the Executive totalling 
450m accounting units are barely 5 per cent of 
the investments made in the steel industry since 
the Community's inception; the High Authority, 
on the other hand, has sufficient data at its disposal 
to assess the regional implications uf re<levelopment 
in the steel industry. It is to be regrettE'd that the 
High Authority has not been able to make its 
intervention in support of creating ne\v capacity 
subject to the closing down of marginal capacities. 
Vv'hat has been lacking has been a sector policy 
dovetailed with a sound regional policy. 
It is true that in its General Objectives for 
Steel, the High Authority has been concerned with 
medium-term trends but its objectives are put 
forward as little more than forecasts. They do not 
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have the stature of a policy. It will be for the new 
ExE'cutive-and it will be a major challenge--to 
give its action in the sted industry this new 
stature. 
20. It is neither necessary, nor even desirable to 
wait. bdorE' doing this, until agreement is reached 
on \\'idening the scope--pursuant to ArticlE' 95-of 
thE' Trt'aty provisions on the powers of the 
Executive; for if one does, one is liable to be 
carried along with ewnts. An effort should be 
made, by making the most of the Treaty in its 
present form, to conduct a Community st~uctural 
policy- in the steel industry. Your Committee 
considers that this is not only possible but also 
that it is a matter of urgency. 
The following paragraphs will deal with the 
need for a structural policy, outlining what should 
be its guiding principles. 
IV -An industrial policy in the steel sector 
The need for a structural policy 
21. To resolw the problems facing the ECSC 
steel industrv some control must bE' exercised i.e. a 
structural policy must bE' pursued in this sector. 
This is necessary if only because a great many 
steel firms are concentrated in regions that are 
alrE'ady affected by the regression prevailing in 
other sectors, so that the regional and social 
consequences of the difficulties facing the steel 
industry call for special attention. 
It is also dt'sirable for the public authorities 
to make it easier to close down those plants which 
are not profitable enough. In some cases State 
assistance owr a limited period will be needed to 
enable the steel industry to readjust its structure 
in relation to changes in location and in relation 
to changes in techniques and trends in capacity 
in non-member States. Failing any intervention 
by the public authorities, the competitiw position 
of a good manv steel firms is liable to be adversely 
affectt'd. 
Various member States have already taken 
mE'asures at the natiomJ lenJ; if these are not co-
ordinated at Community level, they will disrupt 
the common market and this makes the 
implementation of a Community policy imperative. 
The aim of a structural policy 
22. The European stE'el policy must be designed 
to prevent any collapse of prices and, in the longer 
term, to give a balance between supply and 
demand; it should also frame a satisfactory solution 
to the regional and social problems arising, bearing 
in mind the need for an optimal utilization of 
production factors. The European steel policy 
should lead to a continuous and smooth adjustment 
to technological progress and to an increase in 
productivity. 
National measures 
23. If one wishes to outline the primary 
components of a European policy, one has to 
take into account the measures taken nationally. 
The assistance ginn by France to its steel industry 
has stemmed from a serious concern to rationalize 
and has been organized on the basis of an agreement 
between the industry and the public authorities. 
A summary of this agreement, which unduubtedl\' 
has its positive aspects, is gin·n in Annex II. This 
agn·ement was concluded in July 1966 and, in 
essence, provides that the stee 1 industry \\·ill put 
through a rationalization plan bearing in mind the 
social and regional polic\· needs; it ivill attract 
interest rebates and low cost energy and transport 
facilities. This agreement is a reality \\·hich cannot 
be ignored; it lays clown the broad outlines of a 
planned policy iYhich has the agreement of those 
involved. The scope of the French measures and 
of those envisaged bv Belgium is such as to go 
beyond the limited f~amework of the interests of 
the employers and \Yorkers concerned. "\ccm·cling 
to the press, the French Prime .i\Iinister made the 
following statement: 
'Other kev sectors will later be tlw subject of 
a similar .policy (to the policy applied in the 
steel sector); this is a policy which the 
deYelopment of the Common l\Iarket makes 
essential .. .' (1) 
The result of this is that the plan applied to 
the steel inclmtrv is regarded in France as being 
the model for the policy to be implemented in 
other sectors. 
24. The danger of national measures from the 
political point of Yiew is that they could trigger 
off counter-measures and culminate 111 the 
disintegration of the Common l\Iarket. From the 
moment iYhen a national plan is laid dmvn, there 
i\'ill be no hesitation, if its success should be 
threatened, in proposing to block inYestments or 
freeze intra-Communih· trade or eyen in proposing 
the two types of meas;res at the same time. . 
In the long term the implementation of a 
national steel policy in the yariou~ member State,; 
will be an ob~tacle to an optimal geographical 
spread of the steel industry in the Common Market 
and, indeed, to an optimal use of production 
factors in the ECSC. 
The national measures will handicap the 
creation of a steel industry on a European scale 
which is able to face up to. the competition of the 
large production units of the Vnitecl States and 
Japan. It was with some justice that Mr. Coppe, 
( 1) Combat of 28 July 196n. 
then \'icc-President of the High Authority, stated 
in the European Parliament in January 1 H67 that 
the returm to non-Community solutions would 
have unforeseeable consequences.( 1 ) 
Starting points for a European policy under the 
Treaty 
25. Your Committee considers that the Treaty 
of Paris contains enough pro\'isions to which 
recourse may be had in orrler to frame a policy 
for the European steel industry. As regards 
subsidies, the main Articles to scn·e as a basis 
for this policy are 4,c and 67.3. Article 4G,3 (items 
4 and ;) ) and Article 5G make it possible for the 
Executiye to co-operate with the Go\'ernments in 
impleml'nting a structural policy that is satisfactory 
from the social standpoint. As regards long-term 
policy, the main Articles are +G,3 (items 1,2 and 3) 
and Article ~1±. Lastly, the general co-ordination 
of national measures could be ba::,ecl on Article 26. 
Oln·iousl y nothing can be clone if the Council does 
not evincl' the the necessary political resolye. Yet 
the European Commission too must first of all put 
forward a coherent co-ordination plan. This plan 
should leaYe room for action at the national level, 
although this should be carefully controlled until 
the stage of Economic Union is reached. The aim 
should be to SL'e that the industrial policies of the 
member States do not clash but rather fit into a 
Community frameivork. 
26. Your Committe considers that granting 
interest rebates, in whatewr form, is inconsistent 
with Article 4,c. It cannot accept the frankly 
disappointing replies given recently by the High 
Authority to the questions asked on this subiect 
by Messrs. Berkhouwer, Oele and Kriedemann.(2) 
The French Government, of course, justifies 
making loans to the French steel industry at 
faY<mrahle rates with the argument that towards 
the end of the fifties, it kept steel prices artificially 
low so that the steel industry was unable to take 
acl;-antage of the shortage then preyailing. 
Favourable credit facilities haw thus to be set 
off against a loss of earnings in the past. 
In new enterprises, inte1est rebates may cut 
production costs considerably. A difference in the 
interest rate of 3 per cent means a difference of one 
quarter in the capital charges so that the production 
costs of newly-integrated firms may be reduced by 
from 8 to 10 per cent. There is undoubtedly a 
danaer of escalation when it comes to interest b . 
rebates. This means that Community regulatwns 
on assistance measures and subsidies are essential. 
Then again, special importance should be 
attached to steel firms iYhich come under strong 
(1) DeLCJte of 31 January 1967, pdge 32. 
(') Oft<Cial Gazette No 8~ of 27 Apnl 19R7; No 1~3 of 23 June 1967 and 
No. C:22 of 18 March 1968. 
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State pressure. In these cases, subsidies are often 
very indirect. The report hy Mr. Blaisse(1) gives a 
detailed analysis of the possibilities open under the 
Treaty in thi~ regard. 
The bases for a European policy 
(a) Note on the policy to be followed 
27. .\s stated in paragraph 19, it would be 
desirable for the Executin· to make its general 
objectiws clear so that the,ce might constitute a 
statement of structural policy. Thi,., means that it 
is no longer enough to draw up foreca;,ts: the 
'objectiws' must indicate in broad outline the 
way in which the situation ought to dewlop. In 
otlwr \n,rd·;, the foreca"ts made ~wailabiP to elate 
need to acquire a third. yiz. a political dimension. 
The Executiye hos for many vearo; been g;1thermg 
a good dt·al of d<tta about the skt·l indm.tlT and 
thus ha'- a detz1ikd insight into its prohkms. its 
structure and \\·hat it can d(); it should therefore 
be able, within a reasonable period. to co-operate 
with interested parties in dra\Ying up a statement 
on the policy to be followed. 
(b) Concmtrations 
(a a) Need for concentration 
28. An important aspect of the new Executive's 
work will consist in imparting the right emphasis 
to the proces" of concentration in the steel industry. 
As stateclm paragraph fi, there has to be some 
production capacity slack. Yet the m·er-invPstment 
of recent years, both in the Community ancl outside 
it, has been prPjudicial both to th· i1rm,; concerned 
and to the economy as a \\·hole. Thert~ is the heas.v 
fillancial burden of tlwse inYestn-,ent~ and the 
fact that O\'er-in\T~tment helps to accentuate tl1e 
fall in prices. The firms themsdw:; have been 
respon:oihle for the building up nf surplus capacities. 
At a time when they \\Tre in a position to finclllCP 
their investments from their 0\\'11 resources, they 
did not alway,; act with clue carP. The m cf'ssity of 
making a chmce, which normal borrowing conditions 
makes necessary, was often not an opcratiYe factor. 
It is unfortunate!~, probahle that the ,.,urplus 
capacities will increase further in the year:, ahead. 
Pl~mt modernizc:Jion is often accc•mpanied hy an 
increa~c in capacity. As to the dt cision of rmmy 
de,-e loping countries to build their own ~tee 1 
ir:dllStrieo-;, this has not played a gn·at p<1rt in the 
increase in wor1rl capacities. Cn:ck steel procluc l Hm 
potcntiz,l was 200m tuns for the whole \Yurld in 
HJGO, [>00m tons 111 19liG and an estimated 6811m 
tons is the forecast for 1970. 
29. The Ex('cutive must giw some support to 
inwstments and the TrPaty of Paris giws it 
certain opportunities to do this. Yet the effec-
(1) Doc. 173/66, paragraphs 24 to 30. 
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tiveness of such action will depend not only 
on the goodwill of the steel firms which must 
remain free to inwst as they think fit, but also on 
that of the goYernments. which must be ready to 
co-ordinate their policies. This co-ordination should 
he effected bv reference to a European Commi:osion 
pbn. . ' 
30. In the longer term. the balance between 
output and production potential may be struck 
mainly by recoursE' to greater concentration. The 
structure nf the Community market is yery different 
from that of the l~nitecl States or Japan. (1) 
Concentration has not yet reached the stage 
where thPre is any fear of some firms dominating 
the markd. A furthPr reduction in the number of 
deci,ion-taking centres appear;; to be the current 
trenrl. There i.~ no reason to belie\·e that the pattern 
of structura 1 dewlopments in the stt~el industry 
\\ill he wry difiercnt in the Community from that 
of the l'nitecl States. Tlm,.,, although this 
concL·ntration prol"?~~ IYill proha bly continue, even 
if nothing is done to smooth its way, your 
Committee tl1inb that tlw Exccntiye must submit 
propo,;als to direct this process, bearing in mind 
that it mav later be necessary to oppose any undue 
nwa~urc of concentration. 
31. The success of the Kennedy Round nego-
ti3tiun:o make" it more ner:es:"ar)· than ever to 
rationalize the structure of the European steel 
inrlnstn·. External clutit·s applicahle to c,teel 
product,; will 8Yerc:.~e 3. 7 pn cent. Third country 
firms uo::ing dlP::l[Wr labour or cheaper raw 
materials or bnth \YI11 cert::linlyhe able to oYercome 
this tariff ob•;taciP. SuhjPct to \\'hat was said in 
Section 7, therdore, competition beh\ een 
Communih· firm" and the steel indu:o,try of third 
countric~ \\·ill become keenl'T. Tlns means that, 
more than enT before, the reln·ant markPt for 
many Community c,teel producers will assume the 
dtmt>nsions of thr \vnrlcl market itself. This is a 
further rea ~un for pur~ning a flexible polic)' "ith 
regard to projected comentratwns. 
(bb) Forms of concentration 
32. Cuncentration may assume clifferL'IJt forms. 
Initially concentration moy inynlYP ~dting up 
joint s~lling agencib or ct;ncluding co-operation 
agn·ements tu orp~111ize "PLctalization; thc·"e would 
appear to he the mo:--t practical futms of concPn-
tration. There are con~idcrable ady<,ntoges to he 
gained from c,tottmg up joint ~dlmg agenc·ies: 
(a) fir~tly tlw_'; allow of a mP:=lsure of production 
ratill:1ali;:ation; s<'llmg cu~ts arc cut, stuck,; 
can be redur•'d and, hy combining orders, 
r.ttioiMl production prngrztmmes can be drawn 
up; 
(1J In th(' l'mt d St.:J.t•·::- the m.-~.rkf't 1'> <lrnum.Jtr-d by onf' g,I,mt Pntcrpnst>, 
"iYh•h•· .1nnuJ.l outpat 1'- ~(im ton" of str,_·l, om' VlTY larg<-' firm proJucmg 
IHrn tr>tts .lll<i StTVCTdl m•-tllurrt-'"1(.• d tlrnts "h;ch ,~Jt h pruducc be twPcn 
7 anrl ~m tons •>t sk•·l fhv ttncc Lng-t·st flilllS In Jap.m togcih~r control 
morf' th.:m halt ot the markd. 
(b) joint selling agencies check the trend towards 
over-investment because each firm can only 
supply the quota allocated to it; under these 
conditions an extension of capacities is of little 
interest and a firm can concentrate its efforts 
on internal rationalization; 
(c) joint selling agencies can be conducin' to a 
stabilization of price levels because the market 
becomes more transparent and becau,;e risks 
of discrimination are reduced (provided, of 
course, that one is dealing with a buver's 
market); · 
(d) lastly, joint selling agencies can be the first 
step towards a larger-scale concentration; the 
Federal German Minister for Economic Affairs 
has, moreover, described the Community 
selling agencies as 'breeding grounds' for 
mergers. 
\Ye are reminded that a firm coming under 
the '\Vest' selling agency, namely August-Thyssen-
Hiitte, asked to be able to merge with a firm in 
the 'North' selling agency, Hiittenwerk Obe1hausen 
AG. It is seen therefore that, as regards concen-
trations, partners are not always sought within 
the same selling agency. 
Your Committee and Parliament have already 
returned a distinctly favourable Opinion on the 
German selling agencies. Setting up these 
straightforward selling agencies itself involves 
many difficulties, precisely because they do, in 
practice, imply a form of specialization. To begin 
with, they may be regarded as a satisfactory form 
of concentration. They cannot, however take the 
place of larger-scale production centres which are 
constituted through mergers or amalgamations. It 
will not be possible to make any final assessment 
of the usefulness of these agencies until it can be 
seen how well they are able to pursue a co-ordinated 
and effective investment policy. At present their 
main value lies in co-operation in the field of sales. 
33. Large concerns usually haye greater access 
to finance than small ones.Yet the main ad,·antage 
of merging several small or medium-size units is 
that certain capacities can he taken out of service. 
In this connexion, it is wry important that 
there should be international concentrations not 
only national ones, the former type being extremely 
rare. International mergers should therefore be 
made easier to achie\'e. Priority should be given to 
drawing up articles of assoe1ation for a European-
type company. Unless some progress is made soon 
here, national steel cartels will probably come into 
being and this would be the end of the Common 
Market. 
Lastly, it should be stressed that-at least as 
regards some phases in production-quanhty 
production is now a must for rational production. 
The follmYing table bears this out \Yith reference to 
p1g-uon: 
Daily output Capital cost Operation 
in tons of of plant m costs in 
pig-iron 1mllion DM DM per ton 
I. 4 blast furnaces 
of 5 m diameter 3,00 104 28.-
II. 1 blast furnace 
of 10m diameter 3,000 77 2l.l0 
III. 2 X 4 blast furnaces 
of 5 m diameter 6,000 208 28.-
IV. 2 blast furnaces 
of 10m diameter 6,000 102 20.20 
Source: Survey by the Technische Hochschule Aachen (Institute of Advanced 
Technology of Aachen) quoted in Industnekurier of November 1966. 
The future of small and medium-sized firms is, 
however, secure in certain cases, particularly as 
regards special steels. Firms having a small number 
of production lines and which constitute a well-
balanced whole will, more often than not, surviye 
but if they wish to continue to hold their O\Vn, they 
will have systematically to specialize and to 
integrate their activities in terms of increased 
processing operations and they will have to organize 
their commercial co-operation. 
(c) Subsidies 
34. With reference to the note on the policy 
to be followed-discussed in Section 27-the 
Executiw will have to see which forms of State 
aid are consistent with the policy outlined therein. 
The following principles can already be 
outlined: 
(a) investment subsidies should not be granted 
when the creation of new capacities is not 
coupled with the closing down of obsolete 
plant; 
(b) there must be continuity of employment in 
regions affected by rationalization and 
redevelopment measures; 
(c) where assistance towards investments is 
granted, this must be done in compliance with 
Community criteria; it must increase the 
competitive capacity and raise the technological 
level of the Community's steel industry; 
(d) investment subsidies must be co-ordinated in 
such a way as to prevent any sort of 
'overbidding' on the part of national 
t>xchequers. The guiding principle of the 
Executive's policy on subsidies should be the 
need truly to rationalize the structure of the 
steel industry. The harmonization of national 
subsidies at the highest leYel cannot be regarded 
as the answer for such an expanding sector 
as steel. The High "\uthority's Decision 
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No. 3/65 on coal subsidies would not be 
inapplicable to the steel sector. As for the 
provisions on coking coal enacted early in 
1967, these should be renewed even if technical 
developments will eventually restrict their 
effect. They are, in fact. the only ones which 
would allow the Community to standardize 
cost factors. It should be pointed out here that 
the differences in prices of petroleum products 
also constitute a source of distortions because 
of the increasing use made of these products in 
blast furnaces; 
(e) as far as possible. care should be taken to 
avoid any artificial reduction in variable 
costs by supplying cheap coking-coal or 
special transport conditions; a European 
policy for energy and transport could. in this 
respect, ensure the equalization of competitiye 
conditions. 
Extracts from recent resolutions passed by the European Parliament on the 
problems of the Community's steel industryC) 
Resolution 
on the Memorandum of the High Authority of the 
European Coal and Steel Community on the General 
Objectives for Steel of the Community for 1970 
:3. Stresses that the social effects that the present 
d1fflcult1es may have are deeply disturbing those 
sections of the population which are directly affected 
and may permanently jeopardize confidence in the 
Commumtv and m its ahihty to act unless effective 
measures are taken soon to overcome these difficulties. 
4. Looks to the High Authority and to the 
Council to submit as soon as possible a programme 
for adjustmg the steel industry to economic and 
technical deyclopments and to provide for Commumty 
measures to deal w1th the present threat of a crisis. 
Resolution 
on the situation in the steel market and on certain 
coal questions in the Community 
l. Considers that the common market for steel 
in the Community IS-bearing in mind, too, the 
state of the world market-in a disquieting situation 
and that it would be desirable to remedy this by 
taking short and long-term measures at Commumty 
leYcl, coupled with trade policy measures, all of 
which should fit in with the general econonues of 
the member States; 
4. Con~1ders that, in regard to tht> production 
policy to be pursued, it would he desirable to see 
whether and, If so, bv reference to what criteria, 1i 
might be possible to close down obsolete plant partly 
or completdY. 
6. Considers that to restore the market to normal 
by improYing productivity and modermzing plant, 
there should be an amalgamation of enterpnses, so 
as tn bring, gr0aier productwn umts mto bemg and 
promote specialization to achleYE' Treaty objectnTs, 
while still respectmg the rules of competition laid 
down in the Treaty and beanng in mind the economic 
situatiun m the regions; 
7. Believes that, under present conditions, the 
nght production pollC)' would be one based on 
inchrect action under the Treaty in the first instance 
and, ~hould this prm·e madequate, on an immediate 
implementation of Article 95, l rather than Article 
58, hearing in mmd paragraphs 4, 5 and () of this 
resolution; implementation of Article 95 should 
comprise hoth short and long-term measures; 
( 1) Of!lczal Gazette No. 28 of 17 Fel.Jruary 1967, page~ 440 und 441, and No. 
151) of 15 July 1967, page 13. 
9. Looks to the High Authority, the Council and 
the member States to pay particular attention to 
pnces and to ensure a better implementatiOn of 
Article GO; 
1 l. Prges that preventive action be taken to 
avoid possible social difficulties and, in this connexion, 
draws attention to paragraph 26 of its resolution on 
the 14th General Report on the Activities of the 
ECSC(1); structural changes must not be pre-
judicial to workers for whom jobs must be found 
and whose standard of hvmg must be kept at its 
present level; 
14. Calls upon the High Authonty and the 
Council to sec to what extent the Trt>aty proYisions 
should he amended, to take into account a coal and 
steel situation which 1s different from that prevailing 
at the time when thE' Treaty \Yas drawn up. 
Resolution 
on the 15th General Report of the High Authority 
of the ECSC on the activities of the Community 
14. Hopes that the measures taken by the Com-
mumty m the steel sector, particularly in the matter 
of im·estment and the regrouping and concentration 
of undertakings, \Yill partake of the nature of a genuine 
mdustrial pohcv calculated to facilitate the necessary 
structural adaptations and fitting naturally into 
medium-term economic policy; 
18. E-x:presses satisfactiOn at the amount of work 
the High Authority is doing in the iield of social 
policy; 
19. Calls upon the High Authority to continue 
and eyen step up these activities and hopes: 
(1i) that an efiective Community-wide labour policy 
w1ll be worked out, based in the main on occu-
pational traimng, with a view to ensuring stable 
employment; 
(iii) that readaptation and industrial redevelopment 
measures w1ll be stepped up and form part both 
of an overall programme and of programmes 
co,~ermg specific areas so as to ensure that workers 
are not dismissed before new jobs have been 
created for them; 
(v) that general criteria \Yill he laid down for fore-
castmg the social consequences of the concen-
trations of undertakmgs planned. 
(') O(hcial Gazette No. I30 of 19 July I966, page 2455/66. 
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ANNEX II 
Summary of the provisions of the agreement concluded between the French State and 
the steel industry in that country 
The agreement concluded in July 1966 between 
the French State and the stC'el industry m that 
country gave official status to the plan drawn up 
by the steel industry itself and made possible its 
execution. 
This plan was drawn up because the French steel 
industry needs, in the years ahead, to make substantial 
investments both to med the needs of the domestic 
market and to withstand foreign competition. 
The steel industry was unable to raise the neces-
sary capital without accumulating e-.;:cessive debts 
and so it turned to the State. 
The agreement laid down a form of planning and 
consultations between the steel mdustry, which 
undertook to adjust its structure to meet the new 
circumstances, and the State which, in exchange, 
granted certain facilities including an important 
contribution in the form of long-term credits at 
reduced interest rates. One might describe this as 
planned policy worked out by common consent. 
The plan developed and filled out those parts of 
the Fifth French plan which relate to the steel 
industry. Unlike the national plan, however, the 1966 
agreement was bmding. 
The agreement had a threefold aim: 
(a) optimal use of production capacities through 
highly rationalized manufacturing programmes; 
(b) the construction of production units of optimal 
size whether for the account of several enterprises 
or not; 
(c) amalgamations at the technical, commercial 
and financial len~ls, beanng in mind the needs 
of the social and regional policies. 
It is estimated that the total investments of the 
French steel mdustry for the period 1966-1970 will 
be at least FF7,000m. This includes FF4,500m for 
the construction of entirely new plants. The assistance 
of the State, which will only go to the latter, will 
amount to FF2, 700m. The loans will be for 25 years 
at an interest rate of 3 per cent in the first 5 years 
and 4 per cent in subsequent years. The breakdown 
of State aid between the different enterprises will 
be the subject of special agreements. 
The agreement also provided that the steel 
enterprises might obtain their fuel under the same 
conditions as their direct foreign competitors. 
To justify this State aid, the main argument 
brought forward was that at the end of the fifties 
the GoYernment obliged the French steel industry 
to peg its prices at a very low level and this resulted 
in a loss of earnings. The agreement also provided 
for the enactment of social measures which would 
JUstify mtervention by the State. 
lt is estimated that the number of workers in the 
French steel industry will fall by 15,000 (out of a 
total of 210,000) by 1970. Retirement, workers leav-
ing of their own free will and a restriction on the 
number of workers taken on will make it possible to 
abolish from between 7,000 to 10,000 jobs. The 
5,000 to 8,000 workers remaining will get the benefit 
of special measures such as the creation of new jobs, 
redevelopment, priority for vacant jobs in the steel 
industry, redundancy allowances, unemployment 
benefits, discharge allowances etc. 
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